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This paper shows that recent changes in the employment structure of 16 European countries 
have been similar to those taking place in the US and the UK. At least since the early 1990s, the 
employment  shares  of  high-paid  professionals  and  managers  as  well  as  low-paid  personal 
services  workers  have  increased  at  the  expense  of  the  employment  shares  of  middling 
manufacturing and routine office workers – a process known as job polarization. To explain job 
polarization,  we  present  a  simple  model  to  capture  the  many  channels  that  determine  the 
demand  for  different  types  of  labor  and  several  new  datasets  are  exploited  to  test  its 
predictions in various ways. In line with recent evidence for the US and the UK, our estimates 
are consistent with the task-biased hypothesis of technological progress proposed by Autor, 
Levy and Murnane (2003) – that technology can replace human labor in routine tasks but (as 
yet) cannot replace human labor in non-routine tasks. We find some support for the hypothesis 
that  mainly  routine  jobs  have  been  offshored  recently,  although  the  estimated  employment 
impact is smaller and less pervasive than that of technological progress. Finally, we show that 
institutional differences between countries and changes in the relative demand for labor due to 
changes in income or income inequality cannot explain much of the variation in employment. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  The structure of employment is constantly changing. Although the net change is 
generally towards better paying occupations (albeit at a modest pace), this process 
often causes alarm, mainly because individuals who have invested a lot in a particular 
skill may find the return to that skill drops as it becomes all but impossible to find a 
job that uses that skill.
1 
  Economists have had a lot to say about the driving forces behind changes in the 
occupational  structure  of  employment.  They  emphasize  the  importance  of 
technological change, globalization (partly driven by technology, but perhaps partly 
also  an  independent  force  from  declining  man-made  barriers  to  trade),  and 
institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant view among labor economists was 
that technology was more important than trade as a driving-force behind changes in 
the structure of employment (see, for example, Johnson 1997; Desjonqueres, Machin 
and  Van  Reenen  1999;  Autor  and  Katz  1999),  and  that  technological  change  was 
biased  in  favor  of  skilled  workers,  leading  to  the  hypothesis  of  skill-biased 
technological change or SBTC (see, for example, Krueger 1993; Berman, Bound and 
Griliches  1994;  Berman,  Bound  and  Machin  1998;  Machin  and  Van  Reenen  1998; 
Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998). More recently, views have been shifting somewhat. 
  Firstly, there is a more nuanced view of the impact of technological change on the 
demand  for  different  types  of  labor.  Autor,  Levy  and  Murnane  (2003)  argue 
persuasively that technology can replace human labor in routine tasks – tasks that can 
be expressed in step-by-step procedures or rules – but (as yet) cannot replace human 
labor in non-routine tasks. The ALM (or task-biased technological change) hypothesis 
is intuitively plausible and they provide evidence that industries in which routine tasks 
were heavily used have seen the most adoption of computers, and this has reduced 
the usage of routine tasks in those industries. Although low-skill production-line jobs 
                                                 
1 For example, the issue of offshoring of US jobs has become a major political issue - see the accounts in 
Blinder [2006, 2007] and Mankiw and Swagel [2006].   3
in manufacturing can be characterized as ‘routine’, so can many more skilled craft 
jobs and many clerical jobs that never were the lowest paid jobs in our economy. In 
contrast,  many  of  the  worst-paying  jobs,  for  example  in  housekeeping,  hotel  and 
catering  and  personal  care,  are  non-routine  in  nature  and  therefore  have  been 
relatively unaffected by technological change. As a result, the distribution of jobs is 
‘polarizing’ with faster employment growth in the highest and lowest-paying jobs and 
slower growth in the middling jobs. Recent empirical work has shown how this has 
been  happening  in  the  US  (Autor  and  Dorn  2009;  Autor,  Katz  and  Kearney  2006, 
2008; Smith 2008), the UK (Goos and Manning 2007), and West-Germany (Spitz-Oener 
2006 and Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg 2009). 
  Secondly,  concerns  about  the  impact  of  globalization  on  employment  in  OECD 
economies have also been changing. The concern in the 1980s and 1990s was largely 
about the displacement of manufacturing as a whole (i.e. as an industry) to lower-
wage countries. More recently, the focus of concern has been about the relocation of 
certain parts of the production process (generally, specific occupations) to developing 
countries, a process often called “offshoring”.
2 The rapid growth of countries like India 
and China in recent years has made many economists feel that globalization is having 
a more powerful effect on the structure of employment now than in the 1980s. For 
example,  Blinder  (2007,  2009)  and  Blinder  and  Krueger  (2009)  estimate  that 
approximately 25% of US jobs might become offshorable within the next 20 years. 
Especially  offshoring  of  service  activities  (as  opposed  to  material  offshoring)  has 
become a popular topic in recent years (IMF World Economic Outlook 2007; Molnar, 
Pain and Taglioni 2007). However, Lui and Trefler (2008) examine the employment 
effects of service offshoring by US companies to un-affiliated firms abroad as well as 
the  employment  effects  of  service  inshoring  –  the  sale  of  services  to  US  firms  by 
                                                 
2 Throughout this paper, by “offshoring” we mean the use of intermediate inputs imported from abroad, 
also known as “offshore outsourcing”. This is different from “outsourcing” or the use of intermediate inputs 
imported from abroad or produced domestically. The  difference between offshoring and outsourcing is 
important here since our model and data only capture the offshore component of outsourcing.   4
unaffiliated  firms abroad. They  only  find small positive effects of service inshoring 
and even smaller negative effects of service offshoring.  
  In  this  paper  we  seek  to  identify  the  employment  impact  of  task-biased 
technological progress and offshoring in 16 European countries. It is likely that the 
forces of technology and offshoring are having similar effects on employment within 
all these countries. However, in many of the European countries there is an additional 
concern – that wage-setting institutions compress relative wages so that there is a 
dearth of low-wage jobs in these economies, and that this explains, in some part, the 
persistently  high  rates  of  unemployment  in  many  of  these  countries  (an  idea 
associated with Krugman [1994] – but see Nickel and Bell [1995,1996]). Therefore, 
this  paper  also  accounts  for  the  role  of  institutions  in  examining  the  employment 
impact of task-biased technological progress and offshoring.  
  Finally, besides the impact of task-biased technological progress and offshoring, 
relative employment could also change due to changes in relative product demand 
following changes in income or income inequality. For example, Clark (1957) finds 
that the income elasticity of demand for services is greater than unitary, suggesting 
that the observed rise in low-paid service employment can partially be explained by an 
increase  in  income  if  preferences  are  non-homothetic.  And  even  if  preferences  are 
homothetic, Manning (2004) and Mazzolari and Ragusa (2007) argue that wage gains 
for  high-income  workers  increase  their  opportunity  cost  of  doing  domestic  chores, 
leading  to  an  increase  in  the  relative  demand  for  some  low-paid  service  workers. 
However, a recent study by Autor and Dorn (2009) examines the growth in low-skilled 
service  jobs  in  the  US  allowing  for  many  different  channels  to  affect  employment. 
They argue that task-biased technological progress has had an important direct effect 
on employment without much evidence in support of the hypothesis that the rise in 
low-skilled  service  jobs  is  driven  by  the  relative  increase  in  consumer  demand  for 
personal  services.  Besides  estimating  the  impact  of  technological  progress  or   5
offshoring, this paper therefore also examines the employment impact of changes in 
income and differences in income inequality. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives evidence as to 
how the employment structure in the European countries is changing. Section 3 then 
provides a simple theoretical framework to organize our thoughts about the channels 
through which technology and offshoring affect the demand for different jobs. Section 
4 describes the data we use. The fifth section presents our empirical results.  
 
2.  A PICTURE OF CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN JOB STRUCTURE 
   
  To provide a snapshot of changes in the European job structure, Table 1 shows 
the employment shares of occupations and their percentage point changes between 
1993 and 2006 after pooling employment for each occupation across 16 European 
countries.
3  This  table  shows  that  the  high-paying  managerial  and  professional 
occupations  experienced  the  fastest  increases  in  their  employment  shares.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  employment  shares  of  office  clerks;  craft-related  occupations;  and 
machine  operating  and  assembling  occupations,  which  pay  around  the  mean 
occupational wage, have declined. Similar to patterns found for the US and UK, several 
low-paid  service  occupations  have  increased  their  employment  shares:  customer 
service  clerks;  personal  and  protective  service  workers;  and  sales  and  service 
elementary occupations. This is an indication that, at the level of the EU as a whole, 
there  is  job  polarization  occurring  in  which  employment  rises  fastest  for  the  best-
paying jobs and falls most for those in the middle of the earnings distribution.  
  We  illustrate  this  further  by  plotting  the  change  in  occupation-industry 
employment  shares  pooled  across  the  European  countries  against  1994  UK  mean 
                                                 
3 The 16 countries are listed in Table 2. Since all countries do not have data for the entire time-span of 
1993-2006, we calculate average annual changes for each country and use these to impute the employment 
shares  in  1993  and/or  2006  where  they  are  not  available.  Section  4  provides  further  details  on  how 
employment and wages have been measured.   6
earnings at the occupation-industry level
4 together with a fitted kernel regression line 
–  shown  in  Figure  1.  We  see  a  U-shaped  relationship,  indicating  relatively  faster 
employment growth in high paying and some low paying jobs. At the European level, 
job polarization does seem to have occurred over the past 14 years. 
  However, we have not yet assessed to what extent this process occurs to the same 
degree  in  all  countries  in  our  sample.  Table  2  therefore  examines  country 
heterogeneity in employment polarization by dividing the occupations listed in Table 
1  into  three  groups:  the  four  lowest  paid  occupations  (mainly  non-routine  jobs  in 
services),  nine  middling  occupations  (mainly  routine  manufacturing  jobs)  and  the 
eight  highest  paying  occupations  (mainly  non-routine  jobs  in  services).  We  then 
compute the percentage point change in employment share for each of these groups 
in each country. Table 2 confirms that employment polarization is pervasive across 
European countries – the share of high-paying occupations increases relative to the 
middling  occupations  in  all  countries  but  Portugal,  and  the  share  of  low-paying 
occupations increases relative to the middling occupations in all countries.
5 However, 
Table 2 also shows there is some country heterogeneity in the extent of polarization. 
We  aim  to  explain  this  heterogeneity  in  our  empirical  analysis  by  accounting  for 
differences in labor market institutions between these countries. 
   
3.  A SIMPLE MODEL 
    
  We sketch a simple conceptual framework for thinking about two potential causes 
of  the  changes  in  the  job  structure  observed  in  the  previous  section:  task-biased 
technological progress and offshoring. Task-biased technological progress assumes 
that technological progress complements with or substitutes for certain tasks used in 
                                                 
4  We  use  the  UK  occupation-industry  wage  (from  the  LFS)  since  there  is  no  European-wide  equivalent 
available. Results should not be affected given the high correlation between wage ranks. We use wages 
from the initial year because of their potential endogeneity: rather than using 1993, we use 1994 because it 
has a significantly larger sample size. 
5 This result is upheld when we add customer service clerks, a middle-paid service occupation, to the four 
lowest-paid occupations: indeed, in this case, we observe an increase in the share of high- and low-paying 
occupations relative to the middling occupations in all countries.   7
production.  Moreover,  the  recent  concern  about  offshoring  has  been  about  the 
relocation of certain parts of the production process rather than the displacement of 
an industry as a whole. We therefore assume that tasks and the offshorability of parts 
of  the  production  process  are  best  captured  by  workers’  occupations  –  describing 
what it is that workers do on the job. 
  In  particular,  in  the  model  presented  below  we  assume  that  the  production  of 
goods or services requires the use of several tasks and that each task is produced 
using labor of a certain occupation together with some other input. Moreover, we will 
assume  that  occupations  are  relative  p-complements  or  p-substitutes  to  capital  (to 
capture technological progress) or foreign labor (to capture offshoring). Important for 
the  empirical  analysis  presented  later  in  this  paper,  we  will  also  assume  that  the 
technology  to  produce  one  unit  of  a  certain  task  is  common  across  industries  –  a 
strong assumption, albeit one that has been used in other models (e.g. Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg 2007)
6 and that we do seek to test later.  
     
  3.A The production of goods and the demand for tasks 
  Assume that output is produced by combining certain building blocks that we will 
call tasks. Some industries are more intensive users of some tasks than others (and 
some industries may not use some tasks at all). In particular, assume the following 
CES production function for good i using tasks  1 2 , ,..., J T T T  as inputs: 
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6 Though they assume that domestic and foreign labor are perfect substitutes.   8
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with  j c the real unit cost of using task j and  i G  real industry marginal costs.
7 
 
  3.B The demand for labor conditional on output 
  To  determine  the  supply  of  tasks,  we  assume  that  task-level  output  can  be 
produced  using  labor  of  a  certain  occupation  and  some  other  input.  In  particular, 
assume that in industry i tasks are produced using labor of type j, ij N , and any other 
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where  the  technology  to  produce  task  j  is  common  across  industries.  In  this 
specification  the  input  apart  from  labor, ij K ,  should  be  interpreted  very  loosely  to 
mean other inputs that is not employment. 




1 1 1 ( , | )
j j j
j j j





- - -  
  = +
   
  
where  j w  is the real wage in occupation j and  r  the real price of the other input. 
Substituting (2) into  (4) and taking logs,  we  can now derive an expression  for the 
demand for labor conditional on industry output: 
(5) 
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where  j s  is the cost share of labor in the production of task j. 
                                                 
7 By “real” we mean relative to the aggregate output price index.   9
 
  3.C The unconditional demand for labor 
  One might want to go further and not condition on industry output. To do this, we 
need  an  industry  demand  curve.  So  let  us  assume  an  aggregate  CES  consumption 
function such that the demand for good i is given by: 
(6)     
1
log log log( / ) log
1





with  L the size of the population and Y real aggregate income,  i P  the price of good i 
relative  to  the  aggregate  price  index  and  1/(1 ) g -   the  elasticity  of  substitution 
between  goods  in  consumption  with  0 1 g < < .  Note  that  the  logarithm  of  total 
demand for output of industry i is unitary proportional to the logarithm of the size of 
the  population  as  well  as  the  logarithm  of  average  real  income  per  capita.  The 
proportionality between the demand for good i and real average income per capita 
follows directly from the assumption that preferences are homothetic. 
  Further assume that firms in each industry maximize profits by setting prices as a 
constant  mark-up  over  marginal  costs,  or  log log log i i P g = G - .  This  gives  the 
following equation for the demand for good i: 
(7)     
log 1
log log log( / ) log
1 1
i i Y L Y L
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Substituting (7) into (5), we then get the following expression for unconditional labor 
demand: 
(8)     
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  This framework captures many different channels of influence on labor demand. 
Of course, many very specific assumptions about functional forms have been made 
and the model does treat all wages of different occupations as given – an extension   10 
would be to model supply to different occupations.
8 However, the simple framework 
presented  above  does  have  the  virtue  of  leading  to  empirical  equations  that  are 
relatively  straightforward  to  estimate.  In  particular,  this  model  predicts  that 
employment in occupation j in industry i will be affected (all else equal): 
a) Positively by the size of the population (L) and real average income per capita 
(Y/L), reflecting that higher real aggregate income increases the demand for labor 
of  type  j  in  industry  i.  Moreover,  if  the  production  function  exhibits  constant 
returns  to  scale,  the  logarithm  of  the  demand  for  labor  of  type  j  is  unitary 
proportional  to  the  logarithm  of  population  size  and  the  logarithm  of  average 
income per capita if preferences are homothetic. 
b)  Ambiguously  by  real  industry  marginal  costs  ( i G ).  The  first  term  in  square 
brackets  reflects  that,  for  example,  industry  marginal  costs  will  increase  if  the 
marginal cost of producing any task that is not task j increases. This increase in 
industry marginal costs will increase the demand for labor of type j, reflecting the 
shift  towards  type  j  labor  to  produce  one  unit  of  good  i.  The  second  term  in 
square  brackets  captures  that  higher  industry  marginal  costs  will  increase  the 
price of good i, which decreases output and therefore labor demand. 
c) Positively by the relative productivity of task j in the production of good i ( ij b ). 
The intuition is that an increase in ij b  shifts the production of each unit of good i 
                                                 
8 Autor and Dorn (2009) present a general equilibrium  framework to analyze the impact of task-biased 
technological  progress  on  occupational  employment  and  wages.  They  assume  a  somewhat  different 
production structure from the one presented above and the paper doesn’t explicitly derive an expression 
for  labor  demand  to  compare  to  equation  (8).  Nevertheless,  both  models  produce  qualitatively  similar 
predictions about changes in labor demand. Firstly, they also find that a decrease in the price of capital in 
the long-run leads to a decrease in the demand for labor if the elasticity of substitution between goods in 
consumption is sufficiently small compared the elasticity of substitution between inputs in production (as 
captured by the third term in equation (8) in square brackets). Secondly, their model also predicts that a 
decrease  in  the  price  of  capital  in  the  long-run  leads  to  a  decrease  in  the  demand  for  labor  that  is 
decreasing in the cost share of labor (as captured by the last term in equation (8) in brackets). Thirdly, as 
we will assume in section 3.D below, Autor and Dorn (2009) assume that routine labor and capital are 
relative p-substitutes in production relative to non-routine labor and capital, thereby predicting an increase 
in  employment  shares  in  high-paid  and  low-paid  non-routine  jobs  at  the  expense  of  employment  in 
middling routine occupations. Finally, because Autor and Dorn (2009) assume aggregate labor supply is 
fixed even in the long-run, changes in relative wages must ultimately be positively correlated with changes 
in relative labor demand due to technological progress. In this paper, we do not account for the possibility 
that technological progress or offshoring also affects relative wages. Although this is a clear theoretical 
shortcoming, Section 4.B below argues that the occupational wage ranking used in the analysis below is 
very stable within each country over time and across countries at each point in time.   11 
towards a more intensive use of task j which increases the demand for type j labor 
in that industry. 
d)  Negatively  by  the  real  cost  of  labor  of  type  j  ( j w ).The  first  term  in  square 
brackets reflects that an increase in log j w  results in a shift away from using labor 
in  the  production  of  each  unit  of  task  j.  The  second  term  in  square  brackets 
reflects the negative employment impact due to a shift away from using task j in 
the production of each unit of good i.  
e) Ambiguously by the real cost of the other input (r ). The intuition for this is that 
an increase in logr  will result in a shift toward labor in producing one unit of task 
j. However, there will be a shift away from using task j to produce one unit of 
good i, which decreases the demand for labor. 
 
3.D Biased technological progress and offshoring 
  Assume  that  technological  progress  or  an  increase  in  offshorability  can  be 
summarized as a secular decrease in the real price of capital or foreign labor or a 
secular decrease of  logr  in the model discussed above. To capture the routinization 
hypothesis, further assume that the elasticity of substitution between routine labor 
and capital is larger than the elasticity of substitution between non-routine labor and 
capital  (that  is,  1/(1 ) j r -   is  larger  for  routine  occupations  than  for  non-routine 
occupations).  Said  differently,  routine  occupations  and  capital  are  relative  p-
substitutes.
9  Similarly,  occupations  that  are  more  offshorable  are  assumed  to  be 
relative p-substitutes with foreign labor. 
  This model would then predict a secular decrease common across industries in 
the  relative  demand  for  routine  labor,  capturing  task-biased  technological  change, 
                                                 
9  Note  that  if 
j r h >
 
for  routine  occupations  and 
j r h <
 
for  non-routine  occupations,  then  routine 
occupations  and  capital  are  p-substitutes  and  non-routine  occupations  and  capital  are  p-complements 
conditional  on  industry  output.  However,  the  regression  analysis  below  only  captures  the  relative  p-
substitutability  between  routine  occupations  (relative  to  non-routine  occupations)  and  capital  and  the 
relative p-substitutability between more offshorable occupations (relative to less offshorable occupations) 
and foreign labor.   12 
and  a  relative  decrease  common  across  industries  in  the  relative  demand  for 
offshorable occupations, capturing the increased use of offshoring over time. Note 
that  the  variation  in  employment  predicted  by  both  technological  progress  and 
offshoring  is  different  from  the  variation  predicted  by,  for  example,  changes  in 
population size or average income per capita. If changes in population size or average 
income  per  capita  would  be  the  only  drivers  determining  employment,  one  would 
expect to see variation in employment that is industry rather than occupation specific. 
This is the way in which our model assumes how different fundamental drivers affect 
employment – assumptions that we do seek to test in various ways in the remainder 
of this paper. 
  
4.  DATA 
 
  In this section we describe our main sources of data on employment and wages, 
our measures of technological change, offshoring, and institutions, as well as data on 
output, industry marginal costs and income. 
 
  4.A Employment 
  Our main source for employment data over time by industry and occupation is the 
harmonized individual-level European Union Labor Force Survey (ELFS) for the period 
1993-2006. The ELFS contains data on employment status, weekly hours worked, 2-
digit  International  Standard  Occupational  Classification  (ISCO)  codes  and  1-digit 
industry  codes  from  the  Classification  of  Economic  Activities  in  the  European 
Community (NACE revision 1). Throughout this paper, we use weekly hours worked as 
a measure for employment, although our results are not affected by using persons 
employed instead.   13 
  Out  of  the  28  countries  available  in  the  ELFS,  we  exclude  9  new  EU  member 
countries
10,  2  candidate  member  countries
11  and  Iceland  because  of  limited  data 
availability. We also discarded Germany from the ELFS because of its too small sample 
size and limited time span. Data for the remaining 15 European countries (Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) is used in the 
analysis.  
  We supplement our ELFS sample with the German Federal Employment Agency’s 
IABS dataset, which is a 2% random sample of German social security records for the 
period 1993-2002. For each individual it contains data on occupation and industry, as 
well as several demographic characteristics (among others, region of work, full-time 
or  part-time  work).  We  drop  workers  who  are  not  legally  obliged  to  make  social 
security contributions (some 9% of all observations) because for them the IABS is not a 
random sample. Lacking a measure of hours worked, we use time-varying information 
on average weekly hours worked for full-time and part-time workers in both East- and 
West-Germany, obtained from the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and  Working  Conditions  (Eurofound)  to  proxy  for  total  hours  worked  in  IABS 
occupation-industry-year cells.
12 We then manually convert the German occupation and 
industry codings to match ISCO and NACE in the ELFS.
13 
  Having  combined  the  ELFS  with  the  IABS,  we  drop  some  occupations  and 
industries from the ELFS sample – those related to agriculture and fishing because 
they do not consistently appear in the data and because OECD STAN industry output 
data is not suited for comparison across countries for these sectors (see Section 4F); 
and  those  related  to  public  administration  and  education  because  German  civil 
servants are not liable to social security and therefore not included in the IABS, and 
                                                 
10 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia 
11 Romania and Bulgaria 
12 Our results are robust to restricting the German sample to full-time workers. 
13 Since we could not find an exact match for all codes, we have two fewer ISCO occupations and three fewer 
NACE industries for Germany.    14 
because OECD STAN net operating surplus data is not reliable for these two sectors. 
Our results are never affected by the exclusion of these occupations and industries. 
   
  4.B Wages 
  Since the ELFS does not contain any earnings information, we obtain time-varying 
country-specific occupational wages from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP)  and  European  Union  Statistics  on  Income  and  Living  Conditions  (EU-SILC). 
These datasets contain wages for individuals in all 16 countries except Finland and 
Sweden. The ECHP contains gross monthly wages for the period 1994-2001, whereas 
the EU-SILC reports gross monthly wages for the period 2004-2006. For the UK, we 
use  the  gross  weekly  wage  from  the  Labor  Force  Survey  (LFS)  because  it  contains 
many  more  observations  and  is  available  for  1993-2006.  All  wages  have  been 
converted into 2000 Euros using harmonized price indices and real exchange rates. 
  To match our employment dataset, we construct an occupational wage measure 
weighted by hours worked. Given that the occupational wage ranking is very stable 
within  countries  over  time  (see  the  next  paragraph),  we  impute  wages  for  missing 
years  by  setting  them  equal  to  the  average  wage  across  the  closest  years  where 
original data is available. For Finland and Sweden, we use aggregate OECD data to 
construct occupational wages using the following formula: 
( ) t DE t DE j
t DE
ct






where  jct w  is the average wage in occupation j, in country c (in this case, Finland or 
Sweden) at time t,  ct w  is the median wage in country c at time t, and  ct s  is a measure 
of wage inequality in country c at time t (specifically the ratio of the 90
th to the 10
th 
percentile derived from the OECD). The variables with the subscript DE refer to the 
value of those variables in Germany. Two implicit assumptions underlie the validity of 
this construction: that occupational wage structures are very highly correlated across 
countries;  and  that  the  level  of  occupational  wage  differentials  is  related  to  wage   15 
inequality  in  the  country.
14  Finally,  in  each  country  wages  have  been  smoothed  by 
pooling together all years for each occupation and estimating a model in which the 
dummy on occupation varies smoothly with a quadratic time trend.   
  Although sample sizes in the ECHP and EU-SILC are relatively small, it is assuring 
that the wage rank of occupations is intuitive, and highly and significantly correlated 
within countries over time. Table 3 provides the wage rank of occupations in 1993 
and  2006,  averaged  across  the  16  countries  and  rescaled  to  mean  zero  and  unit 
standard  deviation.  The  ranking  is  as  expected,  with  corporate  managers  and 
professionals being the most highly paid, elementary and personal services workers 
the lowest paid, and manufacturing and office workers somewhere in between. This 
ranking  is  very  stable  within  countries  over  time,  with  Spearman  rank  correlation 
coefficients of around 0.90, and all significant at the 1% level. 
 
  4.C Task-biased technological progress 
  For  task  measures  we  use  data  from  the  December  2006  version  of  the 
Occupational  Information  Network  (ONET)  database.  ONET  is  a  primary  source  of 
occupational information, providing comprehensive information on key attributes and 
characteristics of workers in US occupations. It is a replacement for the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (DOT) which has been used in earlier research, notably by Autor, 
Levy  and  Murnane  (2003).  ONET  data  comes  from  job  incumbents,  occupational 
analysts  and  occupational  experts  and  is  collected  for  812  occupations  which  are 
based  on the 2000 Standard  Occupational  Code  (SOC). We  manually converted the 
2000 Standard Occupational Code (SOC) used in the ONET data to ISCO.
15  
                                                 
14 We do indeed find that the wage ranking of occupations across countries at any point in time is very 
stable:  in  2001,  for  instance,  the  mean  Spearman  rank  correlation  coefficient  is  0.87,  with  a  standard 
deviation of 0.05. 
15  There  is  no  time  variation  in  ONET,  which  would  be  problematic  for  the  analysis  below  if  the  task 
composition within occupations is changing over time. However, using similar DOT measures across US 
occupations and over time, Goos and Manning (2007) find that most of the overall changes in mean task 
measures  happened  between  and  not  within  occupations.  Also  note  that  ONET  does  not  contain  any 
variation in job task measures that would exist between individuals with the same occupation. However, 
Autor and Handel (2009) use the individual level PDII (Princeton Data Improvement Initiative) data to show 
that occupation is the dominant predictor for the variation in the task measures that are also used in this 
paper.      16 
  One part of ONET consists of some 100 variables related to worker characteristics, 
worker requirements and general work activities. We select 96 of these task measures 
which are closest to the DOT task requirements used by Autor, Levy and  Murnane 
(2003) and Autor and Dorn (2008). Each respondent is asked how important the task 
is for her job, where importance ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (extremely 
important). Each of the 96 ONET variables is categorized into one of three groups: 
Abstract, Routine or Service.  
  We  choose  these  three  measures  following  Autor  and  Dorn  (2009)  to  capture 
technological progress biased towards occupations intense in non-routine tasks – the 
ALM hypothesis. Routine tasks are those which computers can perform with relative 
ease, such as jobs that require the input of repetitive physical strength or motion, as 
well  as  jobs  requiring  repetitive  and  non-complex  cognitive  skills.  The  non-routine 
dimension is split up into Abstract and Service to capture the different skill content of 
these  non-routine  tasks:  examples  of  Abstract  and  Service  tasks  are  “complex 
problem  solving”  (e.g.  needed  by  engineers  and  medical  doctors)  and  “caring  for 
others”  (e.g.  needed  by  hairdressers  and  medical  doctors),  respectively.  That  is, 
although Abstract tasks are non-routine tasks mainly carried out by highly educated 
workers,  Service  tasks  are  non-routine  tasks  that  workers  with  different  levels  of 
education may perform.  
  Examples  of  ONET  variables  used  as  measures  of  Abstract  tasks  are  “critical 
thinking”, “judgment and decision making”, “complex problem solving”, “interacting 
with  computers”  and  “thinking  creatively”.  Examples  of  Routine  task  measures  are 
“arm-hand steadiness”, “manual dexterity”, “finger dexterity”, “operation monitoring”, 
and “estimating the quantifiable characteristics of products, events, or information”. 
Examples of Service task measures are “social perceptiveness”, “service orientation”, 
“assisting  and  caring  for  others”,  “establishing  and  maintaining  interpersonal 
relationships”, “selling”, and “performing for or working directly with the public”.   17 
  For each of these three task measures, we construct a principal component across 
SOC occupations, which we collapse to the ISCO level weighted by US employment in 
each SOC cell taken from ONET. Columns (1) through (3) of Table 4 show the values 
of these three principal components, with mean zero and unit standard deviation, for 
2-digit ISCO occupations ranked by their mean 1993 wage across the 16 European 
countries.  Figure  2  makes  this  information  more  accessible  by  showing  how  the 
Abstract,  Routine  and  Service  task  measures  are  distributed  over  the  occupations 
ranked by their mean wage. Three different types of jobs can be identified. Firstly, 
high paid jobs (located mainly in the service sector) are intense in Abstract tasks, and 
also use Service tasks intensively. Secondly, jobs paying around the overall average 
wage or somewhat less (predominantly found in manufacturing) are intense in Routine 
tasks. Finally, low-paid jobs in services are relatively intense in Service tasks, and less 
intense in Routine tasks than the middle-paid jobs.  
  To capture the idea of skill-biased technical change or SBTC, the fifth column of 
Table 4 also presents the mean educational attainment by occupation. This variable 
derives  from  a  three-level  education  variable  (categorized  with  the  International 
Standard Classification of Education, or ISCED) available in the ELFS, which we average 
by occupation across countries
16. One can see the high correlation between the wage 
rank and educational attainment across occupations. 
   
  4.D Offshoring 
  There are a number of approaches to measuring the impact of offshoring in the 
literature. Typically, use is made of measures of foreign direct investment by OECD 
countries  or  measures  of  imports  in  total  GDP;  the  share  of  intermediate  goods 
imports in total imports; or the share of imports from non-OECD countries in total 
imports. This type of data is available at the country-industry-time level but never at 
the occupation level. However, according to our model we need an occupation-specific 
                                                 
16  Occupational  education  levels  are  very  highly  correlated  among  countries,  the  average  correlation 
coefficient being 0.93 with a standard deviation of 0.03.   18 
measure  of  offshoring to separate  out its impact  from the impact  of technological 
change.  Blinder  (2007,  2009)  uses  ONET  to  provide  a  measure  of  which  US 
occupations are potentially offshorable in the future, based on whether the work done 
in  that  occupation  can  be  delivered  over  a  distance  (physically  or  electronically) 
without quality degradation. Blinder and Krueger (2009) use the individual level PDII 
(Princeton  Data  Improvement  Initiative)  data  to  construct  alternative  measures  of 
offshorability. The authors conclude that their preferred measure of offshorability is 
derived  by  professional  coders  based  on  a  worker’s  occupational  classification. 
Although  we  are  not  professional  coders  and  our  occupational  measure  of 
offshorability  is  derived  from  firm  level  rather  than  individual  level  data,  it  is 
reassuring  to  see  that  the  distribution  of  our  measure  of  offshorability  across 
occupations, education and income levels that we discuss below corresponds largely 
to the preferred measure by Blinder and Krueger (2009). 
  We obtain a measure of offshorability from the European Restructuring Monitor 
(ERM)  of  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  on  Change  (EMCC),  which  is  a  part  of 
Eurofound.  ERM  is  available  online
17  and  provides  summaries  of  news  reports  (so-
called  fact  sheets)  since  2002  about  companies  located  in  Europe  that  announce 
offshoring  plans.  These  fact  sheets  contain  information  on  the  company  that  is 
offshoring part(s) of its production process, such as the country and the industry in 
which it operates, how many workers are employed nationwide or in that particular 
location,  how  many  jobs  are  being  offshored  and  to  which  country,  and,  most 
importantly for our purposes, what kinds of jobs (i.e. which occupations) are being 
offshored.  
  We processed 415 fact sheets (covering May 31
st, 2002 up to June 30
th, 2008), or 
cases  of  offshoring,  to  construct  an  index  of  how  offshorable  the  different 
occupations are. We summed the number of cases for each ISCO occupation
18, and 
generated  a  rank  by  rescaling  the  number  of  cases  across  occupations  to  a 
                                                 
17 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/index.htm 
18 Note that one fact sheet usually contains more than one ISCO occupation that is being offshored.   19 
distribution with mean zero and unit standard deviation. The fourth column of Table 
4 shows this occupation-level measure of offshorability. It can be seen from Table 4 
that although routine occupations (e.g. machine operators, office clerks) are the ones 
that are offshored most often, some non-routine occupations (engineering associate 
and other associate professionals; customer service clerks; models, salespersons and 
demonstrators  which  includes  call-centre  workers)  are  still  much  more  offshorable 
than others (managers, professionals, elementary sales and service workers). Figure 2 
shows that, as a result, offshorability has a distribution across occupations that is 
somewhat  different  from  that  of  Routine  task  importance.  This  indicates  that 
offshoring predicts an impact on the relative employment growth in some occupations 
that is different from the predicted impact of task-biased technological progress.  
 
  4.E Institutions 
  For measures of the importance of labor market institutions in the 16 European 
countries we use information on overall, upper-tail and lower-tail wage inequality to 
generally capture institutional variation across countries – see Lemieux (2008) for a 
discussion of how institutions are related to wage inequality. Ideally, one would like to 
have  measures  of  wage  inequality  preceding  our  employment  time  span  to  avoid 
problems of simultaneity in the estimates below. Rather than using the ECHP, EU-SILC 
and  LFS  discussed  in  section  4.B,  we  obtained  information  about  wage  dispersion 
between 1990 and 1994 for 12 of our 16 countries from the OECD.
19 Averaging over 
those  four  years,  we  use  the  ratio  of  the  90
th  wage  percentile  to  the  10
th  wage 
percentile in each country as a measure of overall wage inequality, as well as the 90
th 
wage percentile to the 50
th wage percentile and the 50
th wage percentile to the 10
th 
wage percentile as measures of upper- and lower-tail inequality, respectively. 
   
  4.F Industry output and industry marginal costs 
                                                 
19  The  four  missing  countries  are  Austria,  Greece,  Luxembourg  and  Norway.  Constructing  measures  of 
overall  wage  inequality  using  the  wage  data  discussed  in  section  4.B  for  all  16  countries  does  not 
qualitatively change our results.    20 
  Measures of industry output and industry marginal costs are taken from the OECD 
STAN  Database  for  Industrial  Analysis.  Each  of  our  16  countries  except  Ireland  is 
included in STAN. This data covers the period 1993-2006 for all 15 of these countries. 
STAN  uses  an  industry  list  for  all  countries  based  on  the  International  Standard 
Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3) which covers 
all activities (including services) and is compatible with NACE revision 1 used in the 
ELFS.
20 
  The  measure  of  output  used  in  the  analysis  below  is  value  added,  available  in 
STAN  as  the  difference  between  production  (defined  as  the  value  of  goods  and/or 
services produced in a year, whether sold or stocked) and intermediate inputs. Value 
added  comprises  labor  costs,  capital  costs  and  net  operating  surplus.  To  obtain 
variation  in  output,  value  added  has  been  deflated  using  industry-country-year 
specific price indices available from STAN for all countries except Ireland, Sweden and 
the UK.  
  Finally, we approximate real industry marginal costs as the difference between net 
operating surplus and production, divided by production. This gives an estimate of 
the  real  average  cost  per  Euro  of  output.  We  use  this  measure  to  proxy  for  the 
variation  in  real  industry  average  costs  –  which  in  our  model  is  identical  to  real 
industry marginal cost – since both are positively correlated with factor prices. 
 
5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
   
  The starting-points for our empirical investigation are equations (5), (7) and (8). 
Introducing country and time subscripts (denoted by c and t respectively), we have 
                                                 
20 Due to limited data on net operating surplus for the NACE industry “Private households with employed 
persons”, we have one less industry when using STAN data in our regressions. The exceptions are France, 
Portugal,  Spain  and  the  UK,  where  this  industry  is  instead  included  in  “Other  community,  social  and 
personal  service activities”  in  STAN.  Although  the  industry “Private  households  with  employed  persons” 
mainly employs low-paid service workers and its employment share has increased from 0.82% in 1993 to 
0.90% in 2006, it is too small to be an important factor of job polarization.    21 
that  the  conditional  demand  for  labor,  the  demand  for  good  or  service  i  and  the 
unconditional demand for labor are respectively given by equations (9), (10) and (11): 
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  5.A Testing the model’s assumptions 
  In this section we try to provide some further evidence on the adequacy of our 
model. One way to test our model is to decompose occupational employment share 
changes into within- and between-industry components. If our model is correct, we 
would  expect  within-industry  changes  in  employment  shares  to  be  negative  for 
routine  or  offshorable  occupations  and  positive  for  non-routine  or  non-offshorable 
occupations (assuming routine or offshorable occupations and capital or foreign labor 
are  relative  p-substitutes).  The  between-industry  changes  in  employment  shares  of 
routine  (non-routine)  occupations  are  also  expected  to  be  negative  (positive),  if 
routine (non-routine) occupations are relative gross substitutes (gross complements) 
with  technology  or  offshoring.  Table  5  shows  that these  expected  patterns  largely 
hold  up  in  the  data:  the  employment  shares  of  managerial  and  professional 
occupations increase both within and between industries; the employment shares of   22 
routine  occupations  in  manufacturing  generally  decrease  within  and  between 
industries;  and  the  employment  shares  of  several  low-paid  service  occupations 
increase within and between industries.  
  As a more comprehensive test of our model, we perform an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) of the dependent variable in (11). The objective of this ANOVA is to assess 
whether  the  channels  which  our  model  highlights,  namely  country-year  (capturing 
variation in aggregate income), industry-country-year (capturing variation in industry 
marginal costs), industry-occupation (capturing variation in the way in which tasks are 
combined to produce one unit of output) and occupation-year (capturing variation in 
wages,  technological  progress  or  offshoring)  effects  are  present  in  the  dependent 
variable. We can identify these channels by controlling for all other possible variation 
that could make the F-test statistic on each of these channels significant. For instance, 
in  order  to  identify  technological  progress  or  offshoring  through  occupation-year 
effects,  one  should  control  for  occupation  and  year  effects  separately.
21  Table  6 
performs this analysis of variance. It can be seen from column (1) that country-year, 
industry-country-year,  industry-occupation,  and  occupation-year  interactions  are  all 
significant.  
  Our  model  assumed  that  technological  progress  and  offshoring  affect  the  task 
production technology similarly in all industries but do not affect the way in which 
tasks  are  combined  to  produce  one  unit  of  output.  Controlling  for  all  other 
confounding dimensions, this assumption would be consistent with the presence of 
industry-occupation variation but the absence of industry-occupation-time variation in 
employment.  Column  (2)  therefore  adds  an  industry-occupation-time  term  to  the 
variance  decomposition.  In  line  with  our  model,  the  industry-occupation-time 
interaction is not statistically significant.  
                                                 
21 Note however that some of these controls can be captured by other dimensions of interest. For example, 
year  effects  are  controlled  for  by  the  country-year  dimension  when  isolating  occupation-year  specific 
variation in employment that is possibly driven by biased technological progress or offshoring of certain 
occupations over time.   23 
  Finally, column (3) adds an occupation-country-year dimension. If the impact of 
technology or offshoring varies across countries due to institutional differences, one 
would expect to see significant variation in  employment along this dimension too. 
However, the table shows that the occupation-year variation in employment seems to 
be  largely  common  across  countries  suggesting  the  employment  impact  of 
technological progress or offshoring is pervasive. 
   
5.B. The employment impact of technological progress and offshoring  
  Having  established  that  there  is  scope  for  our  model  in  the  data,  we  estimate 
labor demand given by equation (9). To capture the effects of technological change, 
we  include  the  three  occupation  specific  task  measures  –  Abstract,  Routine  and 
Service – interacted with a linear time trend. To capture the effects of offshoring we 
include our offshorability measure for each occupation interacted with a linear time 
trend.  In  each  regression,  we  include  industry-country-year  dummies  to  capture 
variation in industry output and industry marginal costs, the country-occupation-year 
specific log wage and dummies for occupation-industry cells to control for industry 
specific task technologies.
22 To account for serial correlation across years, we cluster 
standard errors by country-occupation-industry. We start with estimates that assume 
the pace of change for both technology and offshoring to be the same in all countries. 
Note  that  because  we  standardize  each  task  measure  and  our  measure  of 
offshorability  to  have  mean  zero  and  unit  standard  deviation  across  occupations, 
point estimates are comparable between them. 
  The  first  results  are  presented  in  Table  7A.  It  can  be  seen  from  columns  (1) 
through (3) that employment increases by 1.71% and 1.58% annually for occupations 
one  standard  deviation  more  intense  in  Abstract  and  Service  tasks,  respectively, 
whereas employment in occupations intense in Routine tasks decreases by an annual 
                                                 
22 Note that occupational wages could be endogenous to technological progress or offshoring. However, 
excluding wages from the regressions does not affect our point estimates on these measures.   24 
1.57%. Column (4) shows that employment in occupations that are easily offshored 
decreases by an annual 0.97%. 
  The next three columns show that the size of these employment changes for the 
task measures is only slightly smaller when offshoring is controlled for, and the result 
that  employment  increases  for  Abstract-  and  Service-intense  occupations  while 
employment decreases for Routine-intense occupations holds in all specifications. The 
employment impact of offshoring is by far the most affected: it is reduced to half its 
size or less when one of the task measures is controlled for.  
  Finally, when we include all tasks measures and offshoring in the same regression, 
as in column (9), employment in Abstract-intense occupations grows 14.6% faster over 
1993-2006  (or  1.12%  annually),  employment  in  Service-intense  occupations  grows 
3.38% faster (or 0.26% annually- although this point estimate is insignificant), whereas 
employment in Routine-intense and offshorable occupations grows 9.75% and 4.68% 
slower (or 0.75% and 0.36% per year), respectively. 
  We have until now ignored the other hypothesis for the impact of technological 
change on employment: skill-biased technological change. Within the context of our 
model,  SBTC  would  imply  that  tasks  vary  by  the  amount  of  schooling  required  to 
perform  them,  and  that  technology  is  a  better  substitute  for  tasks the  lower  their 
educational requirement. Productivity would then be predicted to increase over time 
for tasks that can only be performed by highly educated workers. Table 7B therefore 
addresses  the  SBTC  hypothesis  by  including  the  occupational  education  level 
interacted with a linear time trend as a regressor.  
  Column  (1)  of  Table  7B  shows  that  the  education  level  is  indeed  a  significant 
predictor for employment: on average, occupations that have an education level one 
standard  deviation  above  the  mean  education  level  experience  1.68%  higher 
employment growth per annum. However, if SBTC were to be the correct model, the 
task-dimension  of  employment  should  disappear  once  the  education  level  is 
controlled  for,  bringing  the  point  estimates  on  Abstract,  Routine,  and  Service  task   25 
measures (close) to zero. Columns (2) through (4) show that this is clearly not the 
case.  Although  higher-educated  occupations  on  average  increase  their  employment 
faster than lower-educated occupations, the task dimension of employment continues 
to be a significant predictor of employment changes. These conclusions are upheld in 
columns (5) through (8), where we control for offshoring. The one but last column 
enters all task measures together with the education level in one regression, and the 
last  column  in  addition  controls  for  offshoring.  As  before,  the  task-dimension  of 
occupational employment remains important. 
  However, as has become evident from the literature about job polarization, the 
most  important  difference  between  the  hypotheses  of  skill-  versus  task-biased 
technological change is their prediction about employment growth at the lower end of 
the wage distribution. SBTC predicts that the lowest-paying jobs, which are done by 
the  lowest-educated  workers  (and  which  computers  can  do  with  relative  ease),  will 
disappear faster than middling jobs done by workers with average qualifications (and 
which  computers  have  more  trouble  substituting  for).  On  the  other  hand,  the 
routinization hypothesis predicts that employment in the lowest-paying jobs, which 
are intense in Service tasks (which computers cannot easily do), increases compared 
to employment in middling jobs, which are intense in Routine tasks (which computers 
can do with relative ease).  
  Table 7C therefore compares the performance of skill-biased technological change 
with  task-biased  technological  change  for  employment  changes  in  the  13  lowest-
paying occupations.
23 Here the difference in empirical fit between the two views on 
technological change becomes clear: columns (1)-(5) show that the education level is 
no longer a significant predictor for changes in occupational employment over time 
once the Routine or Service task intensity of occupations is controlled for, and the 
point estimate even becomes negative. The Service intensity of occupations, on the 
other  hand,  significantly  predicts  positive  employment  effects,  and  occupations’ 
                                                 
23 The lowest-paying occupations according to the mean European wage: these are the same occupations for 
which  we  performed  the  analyses  in  the  first  two  columns  of  Table  2,  i.e.  excluding  the  high-paid 
professional occupations.   26 
Routine intensity significantly predicts negative employment effects. Controlling for 
offshoring, as is done in columns (6)-(8), does not change these results. It does seem 
noteworthy,  however,  that  the  employment  effect  of  offshoring  itself  is  not  as 
pervasive as the effect of task-biased technological progress. At the lower and middle 
parts  of  the  occupational  wage  distribution,  offshoring  no  longer  has  a  significant 
effect  on  employment  once  task-intensities  are  controlled  for,  and  in  some 
specifications its point estimate becomes very close to zero. All of these results are 
maintained  when  we  include  all  task  measures,  education,  and  offshoring  in  one 
regression  as  in  the  final  two  columns.  We  reject  the  hypothesis  of  skill-biased 
technological change in favor of the ALM hypothesis.  
 
5.C. Country differences in the employment impact of technological progress 
and offshoring  
  Until  now,  we  have  assumed  that  task-biased  technological  progress  and 
offshoring have the same impact in all 16 countries. Since all countries in our sample 
can  be  assumed  to  be  equally  affected  by  similar  changes  in  factor  prices,  an 
additional  test  would  be  to  see  whether  point  estimates  do  not  differ  significantly 
between countries. For example, one could use the specification of the final column 
of Table 7A and further interact the Abstract, Routine and Service specific time trends 
with country dummies. Doing this, the F-test statistic for country heterogeneity is only 
significant for growth in Abstract intense occupations. We also find the employment 
impact  of  offshoring  to  be  pervasive  –  it  is  associated  with  slower  growth  in  all 
countries but Portugal and the UK – although its F-test statistic suggests it is generally 
less pervasive compared to technological progress.  
  To  investigate  this  further,  Table  8  uses  the  specification  in  columns  (5)-(7)  of 
Table 7A and adds an interaction of the time trend for each task measure – Abstract, 
Routine and Service – with measures of wage inequality to capture country-specific 
differences  in  labor  market  institutions.  However,  none  of  the  interactions  are   27 
statistically significant, indicating that countries with more overall, upper- or lower-tail 
wage  inequality  have  not  experienced  a  significantly  different  task-biased  pace  of 
change  for  employment  from  countries  with  lower  levels  of  wage  inequality.
  In  a 
similar  vein,  one  could  show  that  wage  dispersion  does  not  significantly  explain 
country variation in the employment impact of offshoring.
24  
 
  5.D. Testing alternative hypotheses for job polarization 
  So far, technological progress and offshoring have been found to be important in 
explaining  pervasive  job  polarization  in  Europe.  However,  the  analysis  has  not  yet 
been  informative  about  the  employment  impact  of  changes  in  relative  product 
demand following changes in income. 
  There are two ways in which changes in income can be expected to affect relative 
employment. Firstly, the relative demand for services increases if preferences are non-
homothetic  and  the  income  elasticity  of  demand  for  services  is  greater  than  the 
demand for goods. Secondly, relative wage gains for high income workers increase 
their opportunity cost of doing domestic chores and could increase the demand for 
low-paid personal service workers even if preferences are homothetic. To account for 
both possibilities in our data, one can test whether the point estimate on log income 
per capita in equation (10) is unitary and whether it differs by industry. Moreover, one 
could  add  to  this  regression  specification  a  measure  of  income  inequality  and  its 
interaction  with  industry  dummies  to  further  capture  the  possibility  that  low-paid 
services  are  luxury  goods  or  partially  involve  the  marketization  of  household 
production. 
  Results from estimating equation (10) are in Table 9. As predicted by our model, 
column  (1)  of  Table 9 shows a negative and significant point estimate on industry 
                                                 
24 The finding that the employment impacts of technological progress and offshoring do not largely depend 
on institutional differences between countries is also in line with the observation in Goos, Manning and 
Salomons (2009) that there is no strong cross-sectional link between wage inequality and the occupational 
structure of employment across our sample of European countries.   28 
marginal cost, a point estimate on log income per capita of 0.92 with a standard error 
of 0.10 and a point estimate on log population of 1.00 with a standard error of 0.02.  
  To more explicitly account for the possibility that preferences are non-homothetic, 
column  (2)  of  Table  9  interacts  log  income  per  capita  with  a  vector  of  industry 
dummies. Service industries are ranked from high-paid to low-paid by their mean UK 
wage in 1994 and their point estimates are deviations from the income elasticity for 
manufacturing. The estimated income elasticity of demand is significantly bigger only 
for  real  estate,  renting  and  business  activities  and  significantly  smaller  for 
construction as well as hotels and restaurants. In sum, the second column of Table 9 
is not very supportive of the idea that the relative growth in both high-paid and low-
paid service jobs is best explained by an increase in real earnings. 
  Finally, column (3) of Table 9 repeats the analysis in column (2) while adding to 
the regression specification a measure of income inequality and its interaction with 
industry  dummies  to  further  capture  the  possibility  that  the  demand  for  low-paid 
services  partially  involves  the  marketization  of  household  production.  Just  as  in 
column  (2),  the  left  panel  of  column  (3)  reports  the  income  elasticity  by  industry. 
Although  the  higher  income  elasticity  for  financial  intermediation  and  real  estate, 
renting and business activity is intuitive, again the point estimates are not generally 
supportive of the idea that real income growth drives job polarization. The right panel 
of column (3) shows the interaction effects of upper-tail log income inequality with a 
vector  of  industry  dummies.  These  point  estimates  thus  capture  the    idea  that  in 
countries  with  higher  relative  top-earnings,  high-income  workers  could  buy  more 
market provided services using relatively cheap labor intensively. However, the last 
two  numbers  of  Table  9  show  that  the  point  estimates  for  personal  services  and 
hotels and restaurants are  not significant – although positive for both and relatively 
high  for  hotels  and  restaurants.  In  conclusion,  Table  9  does  not  provide  much 
evidence in support of the idea that income or income inequality is at the root of job 
polarization.   29 
   To  examine  this  more  formally,  we  first  estimate  equation  (9)  to  obtain  point 
estimates on the task measures, offshorability, the wage, and industry marginal costs. 
Rather  than  relying  on  country-industry-year  dummies  as  in  Table  7A,  we  now 
condition on industry output. The point estimate on output is 0.94, confirming the 
assumption  of  constant  returns  to  scale.  The  point  estimate  on  industry  marginal 
costs,  given  by  ) 1 /( 1 h - ,  is  1.13.  We  then  substitute  the  estimated  equation  (10) 
given  in  column  (3)  of  Table  9  for  log ict Y in  equation  (9)  and  use  predictions  to 
calculate counterfactual employment changes by wage percentile.  
  In  particular,  Figure  3  plots  three  different  counterfactual  employment  share 
changes  grouping  occupation-industry  cells  into  1994  UK  wage  percentiles  by 
cumulatively  “switching  off”  channels  that  according  to  our  model  affect  relative 
employment growth. The dashed line labeled “income, TBTC, offshoring” is the first 
counterfactual  and  allows  for  all  variation  used  in  the  previous  analysis  to  predict 
employment  changes.  This  line  shows  a  reasonable  fit  to  the  actual  employment 
changes, although it somewhat underpredicts the increase in low-paid jobs relative to 
middle-paid jobs and somewhat overpredicts the increase in high-paid jobs relative to 
middle-paid jobs.  
  When  we  ignore  the  channels  associated  with  income
25,  allowing  only  for  the 
direct  impact  of  task-biased  technological  change  and  offshoring  and  its  indirect 
impact through changes in relative output prices, the fit given by the dotted line in 
Figure 3 improves, more accurately mirroring the relative increase in employment at 
both tails of the income distribution. While not reported in Figure 3, it can be shown 
that technological change and offshoring operate predominantly through their direct 
impacts on labor demand rather than indirectly through changes in relative output 
                                                 
25 This is done by recalculating counterfactual employment while no longer allowing the coefficient on log 
income to vary by industry and setting the coefficients on industry dummies interacted with wage inequality 
equal to zero.    30 
prices – when we switch off the impact of changes in relative output prices
26, we are 
able to predict only slightly less of the relative increase in low-paid jobs.  
  Lastly  we  also  switch  off  the  direct  employment  impact  of  offshoring
27,  to  give 
counterfactual employment changes exclusively associated with the effects of task-
biased technological change, given by the dashed-dotted line in Figure 3. Although 
the  fit  that  also  allows  for  the  direct  effect  of  offshoring  is  slightly  better,  the 
difference is small, with task-biased technological change being able to predict most 
of the actual changes in jobs’ employment shares.
 28 
  In  sum,  we  therefore  conclude  that  task-biased  technological  progress  and, 
although  to  a  much  lesser  degree,  offshoring  account  for  most  employment 
polarization in Europe – changes in income or income inequality are less important. 
The pervasiveness of job polarization across our sample of 16 European countries due 
to task-biased technological progress sheds an important light on the working of our 
labor markets and calls for a better understanding of changes in relative employment 
                                                 
26 Achieved by deducting  ict G - log ) 1 /( 1 g from the dotted line in Figure 3. 
27 By setting the coefficient on offshorability equal to zero. Note that this only eliminates the direct impact 
of offshoring- we cannot separate the indirect impact of offshoring on employment via relative prices out 
from the indirect impact of technological change. 
28  In  this  section,  we  have  used  all  the  variation  in  industry  marginal  costs  to  calculate  counterfactual 
employment – however, this is not correct since only part of that variation is due to technological progress 
(and offshoring). To account for this, we first predict changes in industry marginal costs exclusively due to 
technological change as follows: 
ijc s tt RTI tt RTI j ic c * * * * b ∑ - = D  
where  tt RTI* b   is  the  point  estimate  on  a  linear  timetrend  multiplied  by  the  standardized  routine  task 
intensity index (defined as Routine/(Abstract+Service), with mean zero and unit standard deviation) from 
the  conditional  labor  demand  equation  which  also  controls  for  offshoring;  and  ijc s   is  the  share  of 
employment of occupation j in industry i in country c averaged across all years; the expression is multiplied 
by minus one to account for the fact that productivity has decreased and hence industry marginal costs 
have increased in routine intensive occupations. We then take these predicted changes in industry marginal 
costs and add them to the industry marginal costs in the initial year for each country to get an alternative 
time series for industry marginal costs that only takes cost changes caused by TBTC into account. We use 
the log of this series to calculate our TBTC-only counterfactuals. When calculating counterfactuals for both 
the TBTC and offshoring channels, we simply add the point estimate for offshoring to the calculation as 
follows: 
( ) ijc s tt OFF tt OFF RTI tt RTI j ic c * * * * * * b b + ∑ - = D  
It turns out that our simulated industry marginal costs very closely mimic actual industry marginal costs. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that when we use the simulated costs in calculating the counterfactuals, we find 
a picture that is virtually identical to the reported Figure 3. Also note that this alternative procedure has the 
added benefit of allowing us to separate out the indirect impact of technological change from the indirect 
impact of offshoring – again, however, this does not affect our results.   31 
and wages due to changes in the demand for and supply of skills other than the level 
of education or income. 
 
  6.  CONCLUSIONS 
   
  The recent changes in the European employment structure have been shown to be 
similar to those taking place in the US and the UK. In Western European countries, the 
employment  shares  of  high-paid  professionals  and  managers  as  well  as  low-paid 
personal services workers have increased at the expense of the employment shares of 
manufacturing  and  routine  office  workers.  In  other  words,  at  least  since  the  early 
nineties, there has been pervasive employment polarization in Western Europe too. 
We investigate to what extent these structural employment changes can be explained 
by the routinization hypothesis and offshoring. 
  We conclude that production technologies have become more intense in the use of 
non-routine  tasks  at  the  expense  of  routine  tasks.  In  line  with  the  routinization 
hypothesis, pervasive task-biased technological change has lead to an increase in the 
relative  demand  for  and  employment  of  non-routine  workers  in  both  low-paid  and 
high-paid  jobs  in  services.  Without  making  any  assumptions  ex-ante  about  which 
occupations are more offshorable, our data also suggest that it is mainly manual jobs 
in manufacturing as well as office clerks that have been offshored. Since these jobs 
largely  consist  of  doing  routine  tasks,  offshoring  could  also  explain  part  of  the 
observed changes in occupational employment. We do find scope for the offshoring 
hypothesis, although the estimated impact is smaller and less pervasive relative to the 
impact of technological change. Finally, there is little support for the hypotheses that 
institutions  or  changes  in  income  have  had  an  important  impact  on  employment 
structure. 
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Figure 1. European-Wide Polarization, 1993-2006
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Figure 2. Abstract, Routine, and Service task importances and offshorability for 21 
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Occupations ranked by 1993 mean European wage 
ISCO 
code
Corporate managers  12 4.54% 1.25
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 2.92% 1.02
Life science and health professionals  22 1.86% - 0.13
Other professionals  24 2.82% 0.70
Managers of small enterprises 13 3.60% 1.28
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 3.99% 0.91
Other associate professionals  34 6.77% 2.07
Life science and health associate professionals  32 2.28% 0.66
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 5.48% - 0.17
Stationary plant and related operators  81 1.75% - 0.39
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 8.33% - 2.33
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 1.31% - 0.40
Office clerks  41 12.04% - 1.98
Customer service clerks  42 2.00% 0.19
Extraction and building trades workers  71 8.17% - 0.52
Machine operators and assemblers  82 6.71% - 2.01
Other craft and related trade workers  74 3.19% - 1.37
Personal and protective service workers  51 6.94% 1.15
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 4.11% 0.48
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 6.73% - 1.42




Notes: Years 1993- 2006. All 16 countries, pooled. Employment shares in 1993 and/or 2006 imputed on the basis of
average annual growth rates for countries in with shorter data spans. Occupations are ordered by their mean wage
rank in 1993 across the 16 European countries, unweighted.
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Austria 23% - 0.59 53% - 14.58 25% 15.17
Belgium 17% 1.48 49% - 9.50 34% 8.03
Denmark 24% - 0.96 40% - 7.16 36% 8.13
Finland 18% 6.66 39% - 6.54 43% - 0.12
France 22% - 0.74 48% - 12.07 30% 12.81
Germany 22% 3.04 56% - 8.72 22% 5.67
Greece 22% 1.75 48% - 6.08 31% 4.34
Ireland 19% 6.19 46% - 5.47 35% - 0.72
Italy 27% - 8.20 51% - 9.08 22% 17.28
Luxembourg 22% - 1.66 50% - 8.45 28% 10.10
Netherlands 17% 2.27 38% - 4.68 45% 2.41
Norway 23% 4.96 39% - 6.52 38% 1.57
Portugal 26% 2.39 47% - 1.13 27% - 1.26
Spain 28% 0.96 49% - 7.04 23% 6.07
Sweden 22% 1.91 42% - 6.96 37% 5.04
UK 17% 5.77 44% - 10.32 39% 4.55
EU average 22% 1.58 46% - 7.77 32% 6.19
Table 2. Initial shares of hours worked and percentage changes over 1993- 2006 for high- , middling and low-
paying occupations
4 lowest paying occupations ^




Notes: Years 1993- 2006. Occupational employment pooled within each country. ^ According to the mean
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Occupations ranked by the 1993 mean European wage ISCO code 1993 2006 1993 2006
Corporate managers  12 3,472 3,724 1.70 1.60
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 3,038 3,170 1.43 1.47
Life science and health professionals  22 2,720 3,164 1.22 1.39
Other professionals  24 2,712 2,910 1.17 1.26
Managers of small enterprises  13 2,653 2,685 1.15 0.93
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 2,150 2,324 0.74 0.80
Other associate professionals  34 2,115 2,227 0.74 0.69
Life science and health associate professionals  32 1,915 2,018 0.39 0.28
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 1,789 1,916 0.05 -0.04
Stationary plant and related operators  81 1,793 1,954 0.01 -0.03
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 1,748 1,927 - 0.01 0.02
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 1,733 1,968 - 0.09 -0.02
Office clerks  41 1,679 1,865 - 0.36 -0.15
Customer service clerks  42 1,613 1,732 - 0.50 -0.50
Extraction and building trades workers  71 1,624 1,750 - 0.58 -0.61
Machine operators and assemblers  82 1,565 1,728 - 0.73 -0.61
Other craft and related trade workers  74 1,504 1,598 - 0.89 -0.99
Personal and protective service workers  51 1,424 1,538 - 1.13 -1.05
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 1,402 1,518 - 1.22 -1.22
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 1,237 1,344 - 1.43 -1.50
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 1,112 1,242 - 1.68 -1.70
Table 3. Real monthly wages of occupations across 16 European countries in 1993 and 2006, sorted by 1993 wage rank 
Standardized wage rank
Notes: Mean occupational wages weighted by weekly hours worked in each country in 1993 and 2006 calculated on the basis of ECHP,
EU- SILC and OECD wage data: unweighted average across countries. Average unweighted wage rank across countries. Rank rescaled to
mean zero and unit standard deviation. The correlation between the two wage ranks is 0.994.
Real monthly wage in 
2000 Euros
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level^^^              
(5)
Corporate managers  12 1.80 - 1.18 1.15 - 0.59 2.05
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 1.50 - 0.86 - 0.35 - 0.37 2.83
Life science and health professionals  22 1.47 - 0.16 1.73 - 0.64 2.92
Other professionals  24 1.29 - 1.63 1.14 - 0.51 2.69
Managers of small enterprises 13 1.80 - 1.18 1.15 - 0.59 2.05
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 0.89 0.20 - 0.44 - 0.27 2.22
Other associate professionals  34 0.75 - 1.37 0.93 - 0.12 2.14
Life science and health associate professionals  32 0.36 0.21 0.86 - 0.64 2.40
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 - 0.59 1.33 0.01 - 0.63 1.46
Stationary plant and related operators  81 - 0.49 1.33 - 1.21 1.63 1.56
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 0.43 1.16 - 0.29 0.29 1.68
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 - 1.30 0.81 - 1.79 - 0.62 1.69
Office clerks  41 - 0.42 - 1.29 0.04 1.21 1.91
Customer service clerks  42 - 0.36 - 0.82 0.74 - 0.27 1.89
Extraction and building trades workers  71 - 0.23 0.98 - 0.64 - 0.59 1.55
Machine operators and assemblers  82 - 0.46 1.31 - 1.33 3.18 1.48
Other craft and related trade workers  74 - 1.36 0.67 - 1.30 - 0.27 1.57
Personal and protective service workers  51 - 0.37 - 0.16 0.82 - 0.64 1.67
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 - 1.00 0.52 - 0.53 0.87 1.41
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 - 0.53 - 0.94 1.00 - 0.64 1.66
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 - 1.38 - 0.11 - 0.55 - 0.37 1.40
Table 4. Abstract, Routine, and Service task importances, offshorability, and mean education levels for occupations ordered by their mean 1993 European 
wage
Notes: Occupations ordered by their mean wage rank (wages weighted by hours worked) in 1993 across the 16 European countries, countries unweighted.
^ Source: ONET. Rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1, a higher value means a task is more important. Values for ISCO 12 and 13 are identical
because ONET SOC codes do not allow distinction between these two ISCO occupations. ^^ Source: European Restructuring Monitor. Rescaled to mean 0
and standard deviation 1, a higher value means more offshorable. Values for ISCO 12 and 13 have been made the same by taking the mean weighted by
hours worked. ^^^ Source: ELFS. Weighted by hours worked. 1=up to and including lower secondary education, 2=upper secondary and post- secondary
(non- tertiary) education, 3=tertiary or post- graduate education. Unweighted mean across all countries, for the first year in which education data was
available (usually 1999). Values for ISCO 12 and 13 have been made the same by taking the mean weighted by hours worked.     42 
Occupations ranked by 1993 mean European wage 
ISCO 
code












Corporate managers  12 1.23 1.26 - 0.02
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 1.02 0.71 0.31
Life science and health professionals  22 - 0.12 - 0.41 0.29
Other professionals  24 0.65 0.03 0.62
Managers of small enterprises 13 1.25 1.20 0.06
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 0.87 0.81 0.06
Other associate professionals  34 2.15 1.37 0.79
Life science and health associate professionals  32 0.69 0.22 0.47
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 - 0.18 0.09 - 0.27
Stationary plant and related operators  81 - 0.38 - 0.02 - 0.36
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 - 2.29 - 1.12 - 1.17
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 - 0.39 - 0.18 - 0.22
Office clerks  41 - 1.93 - 2.26 0.33
Customer service clerks  42 0.18 0.11 0.07
Extraction and building trades workers  71 - 0.50 - 0.21 - 0.29
Machine operators and assemblers  82 - 1.96 - 0.69 - 1.27
Other craft and related trade workers  74 - 1.35 - 0.75 - 0.59
Personal and protective service workers  51 1.06 - 0.08 1.14
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 0.46 0.80 - 0.35
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 - 1.38 - 0.93 - 0.45
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 0.90 0.05 0.85
Notes: Years 1993- 2006. All 16 countries, pooled. Between and within effects may not exactly add up to the total change due
to rounding errors. All numbers are percentage points.
Table 5. Shiftshare analysis of changes in share of hours worked between and within industries for occupations ranked by the 
mean 1993 European wage





















F- statistics for interactions:
-
Notes: Years 1993- 2006; all countries; 36,366 observations for each ANOVA. F-
statistics reported, corresponding p- values in brackets. Specifications in columns




Table 6. Analysis of variance for employment
Dependent variable: log(hours worked/1000)
Country* Year
Industry*Country* Year
Occupation*Year  44 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.71* 1.57* 1.11* 1.12*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17)
- 1.57* - 1.40* - 0.74* - 0.75*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17)
1.58* 1.45* 0.44* 0.26
(0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.22)
- 0.97* - 0.59* - 0.56* - 0.30 - 0.36*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
- 0.49* - 0.47* - 0.48* - 0.50* - 0.48* - 0.47* - 0.48* - 0.47* - 0.47*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R
2
0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89





Notes: Years 1993- 2006; all countries; 34,816 observations for each regression. Each regression includes dummies for
occupation- industry cells and for industry- country- year cells. Task importances and offshorability have been rescaled to
mean 0 and standard deviation 1. All point estimates and standard errors, except for those on the log wage, have been
multiplied by 100. Standard errors clustered by country- industry- occupation. *Significant at the 5% level or better. 
- -
- - - -
-
Table 7A. Conditional effect of task importance and offshorability on employment 
Dependent variable: log(hours worked/1000)
- - - -
ABSTRACT task 
importance









   45 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1.03* 1.06* 0.82* 0.92*
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27)
- 0.90* - 0.83* - 0.63* - 0.67*
(0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.21)
0.96* 0.88* 0.48* 0.30
(0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.23)
1.68* 0.83* 1.17* 1.17* 1.53* 0.64* 1.09* 1.15* 0.39 0.28
(0.15) (0.26) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.29) (0.29)
- 0.49* - 0.52* - 0.39* - 0.20 - 0.33*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
- 0.48* - 0.48* - 0.47* - 0.48* - 0.48* - 0.48* - 0.47* - 0.48* - 0.47* - 0.47*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R
2





Table 7B. Conditional effect of task importance, education and offshorability on employment 




Linear time- trend 
interacted with:





Notes: Years 1993- 2006; all countries; 34,816 observations for each regression. Each regression includes dummies for occupation-
industry cells and for industry- country- year cells. Task importances, the education level and offshorability have been rescaled to
mean 0 and standard deviation 1. All point estimates and standard errors, except for those on the log wage, have been multiplied by
100. Standard errors clustered by occupation- country- industry. *Significant at the 5% level or better. 
Education level







   46 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
- 0.78* - 0.94* - 0.84* - 0.29 - 0.29
(0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
1.10* 1.18* 1.15* 1.04* 1.01*
(0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
0.34* - 0.25 - 0.18 0.31 - 0.21 - 0.17 - 0.30 - 0.29
(0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.16) (0.22) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22)
- 0.49* - 0.36* - 0.06 - 0.06
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
- 0.23 - 0.21 - 0.21 - 0.20 - 0.20 - 0.23 - 0.21 - 0.20 - 0.20 - 0.20
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
R
2
0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Log wage




Linear time- trend 
interacted with:
Notes: Years 1993- 2006; all countries; 22,491 observations for each regression. Each regression includes dummies for occupation-
industry cells and for industry- country- year cells. Task importances, the education level and offshorability have been rescaled to
mean 0 and standard deviation 1. All point estimates and standard errors, except for those on the log wage, have been multiplied by
100. Standard errors clustered by occupation- country- industry. *Significant at the 5% level or better. 
Offshorability - - - - -
- - - -
-
-
Table 7C. Conditional effect of task importance, education and offshorability on the 13 lowest- paying occupations
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.72* 1.72* 1.69* - 1.32* - 1.33* - 1.32* 1.35* 1.39* 1.36*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
- 0.17 0.17 - 0.29
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
- 0.24 0.19 - 0.33
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
- 0.23 0.08 - 0.11
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
- 0.53* - 0.53* - 0.53* - 0.54* - 0.53* - 0.54* - 0.28 - 0.27 - 0.28
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
- 0.43* - 0.33* - 0.50* - 0.52* - 0.55* - 0.48* - 0.57* - 0.61* - 0.50*
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
R
2
0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Notes: Years 1993- 2006, all countries except Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Norway; 26,259 observations for each
regression. All regressions contain dummies for occupation- industry cells and for industry- country- year cells. Task
importances, offshorability and institutions have been rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. All point estimates and
standard errors, except for the log wage, have been multiplied by 100. Standard errors clustered by country- industry-












Table 8: Institutions as an explanation for country- heterogeneity in the employment impact of technological change 
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(1) (2)








1.00* 0.73* - 0.06
(0.18) (0.18) (0.04)








- 0.66* - 0.26 0.09
(0.22) (0.24) (0.06)
- 0.05 0.40 0.10
(0.31) (0.28) (0.06)
0.43 0.30 - 0.03
(0.28) (0.42) (0.10)
- 0.22 0.04 0.06
(0.30) (0.25) (0.08)




Table 9. Product demand                                                                                                                                                                 
Dependent variable: Log(industry output)
(3)












Measure interacted with manufacturing -
Deviation from interaction with manufacturing:
Electricity, gas and water supply -
Financial intermediation -
Real estate, renting and business activity -
Transport, storage and communication -
Construction -
Wholesale and retail -
Health and social work -
Other community, social and personal 
service activities
-
Hotels and restaurants -
Notes: Years 1993- 2006; all countries, except Ireland, Sweden and the UK in first column; and Austria, Greece,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the UK in the second and third columns; industry "Private
household with employed persons" included in "Other community, social.." for France, Portugal, and Spain.
Each regression includes dummies for industry cells. Industries ranked by their mean gross real hourly UK
wage in 1994; the rank of manufacturing is 6. Log income inequality is log(p90/p50) averaged over 1990- 1994 
and rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Standard errors clustered by country- industry. *Significant at
the 5% level or better. 
Observations 1,260
R
2 0.98
 